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羅伯特．F．甘迺迪
(ROBERT F. KENNEDY)
反對越南戰爭
Against the War in Vietnam
在戰爭結束時，只會有更多戰死的美國人……以致他們可以說，正如塔西陀評述羅馬時所說：
「他們造成一片沙漠，稱它為和平。」
羅伯特‧F‧甘迺迪(1925－1968)在他的哥哥約翰‧F‧甘迺迪總統的內閣中任司法部長。1964年羅伯特‧甘迺迪從紐約州被選為參議員，成為越南戰爭的一個重要的批評者和自由主義民主黨人的代言人。1968年3月16日他宣佈自己的民主黨提名總統候選人身份，兩天後對美國的越南政策進行尖銳的抨擊。兩星期後，林頓‧約翰遜總統宣佈他不再參加競選。
1965年約翰遜總統使美國對戰爭的捲入升級成了美國生活中最引起爭議的問題。到1968年，在越南已有五十萬美軍。這場戰爭釀成一場憤怒的反戰運動，損害了公眾對政府、軍隊和其他國家機構的信任。1975年美國從越南撤出最後一批戰鬥人員以後很長時間，那場戰爭的陰影仍繼續影響大眾文化和國家政治。
……這是選擇之年──在這一年我們不單選擇我們由誰來領導，而且選擇我們願意被引向何方；選擇我們自己想要的國家，以及我們為自己的子孫所要的國家。如果在這選擇之年我們按舊幻想塑造新政治，那麼我們只能擔保為自己的未來帶來危機──而且我們將把這些危機的慘痛結果遺贈給子孫。……
今天，我要對你們談談……越南戰爭。我來這裏……是為了同你們討論為什麼我認為我們的有關政策破產了。……
我不想──我相信大多數美國人也不想──出賣美國利益，簡單地撤出軍隊，舉起白旗投降。那樣做對我們作為一個國家和一個民族都是無法接受的。但我擔心──我相信大多數美國人亦擔心──我們目前遵循的方針犯了嚴重錯誤。我擔心──我相信大多數美國人也擔心──我們正在反對中立國和我們歷史上的盟國的判斷和願望，彷彿其他國家概不存在似的。我擔心──我相信大多數美國人也擔心－我們目前的方針將不會帶來勝利，不會帶來和平，不會制止流血，不會增進美國的利益或世界和平事業。
我擔心，在戰爭結束時，只會有更多戰死的美國人，我們更多的財富被耗費；而且因為戰爭雙方的痛苦和仇恨，又有千千萬萬越南人遭殺戮；以致他們可以說，正如塔西陀評述羅馬時所說：「他們造成一片沙漠，稱它稱為和平。」
而我認為這並不真正是美國精神的全部含義。
讓我以個人和公職的雙重身份開始這一討論。我曾參與制訂許多對越南問題的早期決定，正是那些決定導致我們走上現在這條道路。很可能我們在越南問題上的努力一開始便注定要失敗；從來就不可能真正把南越全體人民置於我們所支援的歷屆政府統治下──南越的一任又一任政府被腐敗、低效和貪婪所困擾，沒有也無法吸引和激發人民的民族情感。如果情況確是如此，我願在歷史和我的同胞們面前承擔自己的一份責任。但過去的錯誤不能成為它永遠存在的藉口。悲劇是活著的人賴以取得教訓的工具，不是指引生活的嚮導。讓我們一如既往用古老的檢驗標準衡量自身，以對自己作出公正的評價。如索福克勒斯的《安提戈涅》一劇所言：「人人都犯錯誤，但一個好人知錯就改，並盡力彌補過失。世上唯一的罪惡是驕傲。」
最近幾個月的退卻迫使軍方要求增加二十萬六千兵員。本週末，已宣佈說其中的一部分──被稱為「適度」的增援──將很快派出。然而這不正是我們過去幹過的事嗎?
假如我仔細回顧這場衝突的歷史，我們會發現這可悲的故事一再重覆。每一次──每當危機發生──我們總是否認出了差錯；增派部隊；發表更為自信的公報。每一次我們總是得到保證，稱這一最後步驟將帶來勝利。而每一次，預言和許諾總是落空、被人遺忘，於是又提出在梯子上再爬高一級的要求。
但是所有的軍事升級，所有的最後步驟，都並未比以前的行動把我們帶到離勝利更近一點的地方。相反，戰鬥規模越大，南越政府越是無力組織和保衛自身，而我們則越來越馱起戰爭的全部負擔。
而總統又一次對我們說，正如我們二十年來反覆聽到的，「我們即將獲勝」；「勝利」在望。
但是真實情況怎樣?我們當前形勢如何?……
我們綏靖行動的意義過去一貫被描寫為「深得人心。」我們認識到，向農村提供抵禦越共的軍事防衛將是枉費心機，而且實際上也不可能，除非農村人民視自己的利益與我們的利益相同，不去援助越共，而是幫助西貢政府。為此，我們認識到他們的思想必須加以改變──他們的自然傾向是支援越共，或至少消極觀望，而不是為外國白種人或遙遠的西貢政府流血犧牲。
正是這種綏靖工作上個月遭到嚴重挫折。我們無法改變村莊裏受敵人控制的人民的思想。……如果多年來這些村子由西貢掌管，政府帶來誠實、社會改變、土地──如果它這麼做，如果對人民關於新的、更好的生活的很多許諾均已兌現──那麼，在再佔領的過程中，我們便可作為解放者出現：正如我們
1944－1945年間在歐洲所做的，儘管當時戰爭造成巨大破壞。但是在南越，改革的許諾並未履行。貪污腐化和濫用職權的現象至今猶存。土地改革從來就只是一句空洞的諾言。目睹西貢政府過去三年的所作所為，南越農民沒有理由為這一政權的擴展而戰鬥，沒有理由不把這種努力進一步造成的破壞看作災難。……
過去兩個月的第二個明顯的事實是，西貢政府已不再是比以前更好的盟友；它甚至可能變得更糟了；這場戰爭正無情地越來越成為美國的事。……事實是，數以千計的南越青年花錢買到緩服兵役的特權，而美國海軍陸戰隊士兵卻戰死在溪山。
事實是，西貢政府已逮捕了僧侶和勞工領袖，逮捕了原總統候選人和政府官員──包括維護國家委員會的若幹著名成員。僅僅幾週前美國官員還在這些人身上寄予厚望。
同時，西貢政府的腐敗愈演愈烈，正在削弱南越並損害我們援助其人民的努力。……
第三，這一點變得日益明顯：我們取得的勝利將以對我們一度曾希望扶助的國家的破壞為代價。……
一位美國指揮員在談及檳知市時這麼說：「為了救這座城鎮，有必要毀了它。」當美軍指揮員們決定用空襲和炮火拯救他們的士兵生命時，很難與他們爭論是非；如果美國部隊是為越南的城市而戰，那麼他們理應得到保護。我無法弄懂的只是，為什麼重佔順化、檳知和其他城市以及隨之造成的破壞，其責任竟首先落在美軍身上。
如果共產黨起義者或侵略者們佔領紐約、華盛頓或舊金山，我們不會讓外國人去收復它們並且在此過程中毀了這些城市及其居民。……
倘若西貢政府的部隊不願或無力為他們的城市戰鬥，我們也不能毀了他們。那種救世之道不是我們設想自己能為它們做出的行動。因為我們必須問美國政府，問我們自己：這種邏輯推演到哪一步才是終結?
如果有「必要」為了「拯救」南越而毀滅整個南越，我們也會這樣做嗎?
如果我們對南越漠不關心，樂意看到其國土被毀，人民被殺，那麼我們當初為什麼要去那裏?
難道我們能自授上帝莊嚴的權力──決定哪些城市村莊該被摧毀，決定人們的生死，決定哪些人將加入難民的行列，在我們創造的沙漠中流浪?……
我們且不要誤解。對這場戰爭不可能有任何簡單的道義上的答案，不能單方面譴責美國的行動。我們應當捫心自問的是：我們是否有權給另一個國家造成如此嚴重的破壞，而手頭又無清晰可信的證據說明這種破壞乃是它的人民的要求，而這恰恰是我們所欠缺的證據。他們要求和平，不受任何外部勢力左右的和平。這正是我們擔保要盡力帶給他們的，而且不是在遙遠的未來，是在殘存的些許生命亟待從大屠殺中得到拯救的時刻。
第四個事實現在比以往任何時候更明瞭，即越南戰爭根本就不是對美國最後的嚴峻考驗，實際上它削弱了我們在亞洲、在世界的地位，侵蝕了在過去三十年間直接支撐我國安全的國際合作結構。……我們最初是要證明我們在世界任何一個地方承擔義務的意願。可是我們正在證明，美國人民已不可能再自願投入這種鬥爭。與此同時，我國最老、最強的那些盟國撤回到自己的海岸，只剩下我們獨自在全亞洲充當警察。……
我們有權質問，人們要求我們質問：還需多少兵員、多少生命、多少破壞來取得永遠即將來臨的勝利，填入我們夢的無底深淵?
但是對這一問題美國政府不回答也無法作出回答。它沒有答案──除了在一場以往靠軍事力量已不能解決任何問題的衝突中不斷增派兵力，利用更多的我國英勇士兵們的生命。
人們早就該質問：這場戰爭正給我們帶來什麼後果?
當然，它使我們耗費金錢──占聯邦預算的整整四分之一。但這只是我們付出的最小代價。真正的代價是我們的小夥子，他們有數萬人永遠失去了生命。真正的代價是我們的國際地位──對於中立國和盟國都是如此，它們對一個自己無法理解的政策日漸感到困惑和疏遠。
我們付出的更大代價在於我們的內心生活，在於我們國家的精神受到的損害。在一百年中，我們第一次公開反對為國家的事業作出奉獻。或許在我國歷史上第一次在我們的軍隊中出現了由政治和道義上的原因造成的開小差行為。我們的報紙頭版刊登美國士兵虐待俘虜的照片。每天夜裏我們在晚間新聞中都看到恐怖事件。暴力行動在全國無情地蔓延，騷擾街道，危害我們的生活。不論我們付出什麼代價，讓我們想想派往越南的年輕人：不僅是那些被殺死的，而且還有那些不得不去殺人的人；不僅是那些殘廢的，而且還有那些不得不目睹他們所作所為造成的後果的人。……
這戰爭目前的發展向我們或是向越南人民索取的代價遠遠超過了我們有理由希望從中得到的任何好處。這場戰爭必須也能夠結束，只須怒火滿腔，相信唯有自己才正確的雙方勇士停止互毆，達致和平。我們已向不同的神作了祈禱，而雙方的祈禱均未獲完全的應答。現在雖然仍有時間等待一些祈禱得到部分應答，卻是停止祈禱的時候了。
事實上可做的事很多。我們能夠──正如我兩年來一直催促，而我們始終未做的──與民族解放陣線談判。我們能夠──我們從未這麼做──確保讓民族解放陣線在南越政治生活中切實佔有一席之地。我們能夠──我們今天仍拒絕這麼做──開始讓戰爭降級，集中保衛居民區，以減少美軍傷亡，減緩對農村的破壞。我們能夠──我們從未這麼做──堅持要求南越政府擴大其基礎，實行名副其實的改革，與他們的同胞共同尋求體面的解決辦法。……
但只要我們的現任領導懷著軍事勝利在即的幻想，在我們目前方針的泥淖中越陷越深，那麼即令這一適度而合理的方案也不可能付諸實行。……
附註：
. . . This is
a year of choice－a
year when we choose not simply who will lead us, but where we wish to be led;
the country we want for ourselves－and
the kind we want for our children. If in this year of choice we fashion new
politics out of old illusions, we insure for our- selves nothing but crisis for
the future－and
we bequeath to our children the bitter harvest of those crises. . . .
Today I
would speak to you . . . of the war in
Vietnam.
I come here . . . to discuss with you why I regard our policy here as bankrupt.
. .
I do not
want－as
I believe most Americans do not want－to
sell out American interests, to simply withdraw, to raise the white flag of
surrender. That would be unacceptable to us as a country and as a people. But I
am concerned－as
I believe most Americans are concerned－that
the course we are following at the present time is deeply wrong. I am concerned－as
I believe most Americans are concerned－that
we are acting as if no other nations existed, against the judgment and desires
of neutrals and our historic allies alike. I am concerned－as
I believe most Americans are concerned－that
our present course will not bring victory; will not bring peace; will not stop
the bloodshed; and will not advance the interests of the United States or the
cause of peace in the world.
I am
concerned that, at the end of it all, there will only be more Americans killed;
more of our treasure spilled out; and because of the bitter-ness and hatred on
every side of this war, more hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese slaughtered; so
that they may say, as Tacitus said of Rome: "They made a desert, and called it
peace."
And I do
not think that is what the American spirit is really all about.
Let me
begin this discussion with a note both personal and public. I was involved in
many of the early decisions on Vietnam, decisions which helped set us on our
present path. It may be that the effort was doomed from the start; that it was
never really possible to bring all the people of South Vietnam under the rule of
the successive governments we supported－governments,
one after another, riddled with corruption, inefficiency, and greed; governments
which did not and could not successfully capture and energize the national
feeling of their people. If that is the case, as it well maybe, then I am
willing to bear my share of the responsibility, before history and before my
fellow-citizens. But past error is no excuse for its own perpetuation. Tragedy
is a tool for the living to gain wisdom, not a guide by which to live, Now as
ever, we do ourselves best justice when we measure ourselves against ancient
tests, as in the Antigone of Sophocles: "All men make mistakes, but a good man
yields when he knows his course is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only sin is
pride."
The
reversals of the last several months have led our military to ask for 206,000
more troops. This weekend, it was announced that some of them－a
"moderate" increase, it was said－would
soon be sent. But isn't this exactly what we have always done in the past? If we
examine the history of this conflict, we find the dismal story repeated time
after time. Every time－at
every crisis－we
have denied that anything was wrong; sent more troops; and issued more confident
communiques. Every time, we have been assured that this one last step would
bring victory. And every time, the predictions and promises have failed and been
forgotten, and the demand has been made again for just one more step up the
ladder.
But all
the escalations, all the last steps, have brought us no closer to success than
we were before. Rather, as the scale of the fighting has increased, South
Vietnamese society has become less and less capable of organizing or defending
itself, and we have more and more assumed the whole burden of the war.
And once
again, the President tells us, as we have been told for twenty years, that "we
are going to win;" "victory" is coming.
But what
are the true facts? What is our present situation?...
The point
of our pacification operations was always described as "winning the hearts and
minds" of the people. We recognized that giving the countryside military
security against the Viet Cong would be futile－indeed
that it would be impossible－unless
the people of the countryside themselves came to identify their interests with
ours, and to assist not the Viet Cong, but the Saigon government. For this we
recognized that their minds would have to be changed－that
.their natural inclination would be to support the Viet Cong, or at best remain
passive, rather than sacrifice for foreign white men, or the remote Saigon
government.
It is
this effort that has been most gravely setback in the last month. We cannot
change the minds of the people in villages controlled by the enemy. . . . If, in
the years those villages and hamlets were controlled by Saigon, the government
had brought honesty, social reform, land－if
that had happened, if the many promises of a new and better life for the people
had been fulfilled－then,
in the process of reconquest, we might appear as liberators: just as we did in
Europe, despite the devastation of war, in 1944－45.
But the promises of reform were not kept. Corruption and abuse of administrative
power have continued to this day. Land reform has never been more than an empty
promise. Viewing the performance of the Saigon government over the last three
years, there is no reason for the South Vietnamese peasant to fight for the
extension of its authority or to view the further devastation that effort will
bring as anything but a calamity. . . .
The
second evident fact of the last two months is that the Saigon government is no
more or better an ally than it was before; that it may even be less; and that
the war inexorably is growing more, not less, an American effort. . . .The facts
are that thousands of young South Vietnamese buy their deferments from military
service while American Marines die at Khe Sanh.
The facts
are that the government has arrested monks and labor leaders, former
Presidential candidates and government officials－including
prominent members of the Committee for the Preservation of the Nation, in which
American officials placed such high hopes just a few weeks ago.
Meanwhile, the government's enormous corruption continues, debilitating South
Vietnam and crippling our effort to help its people. . . .
Third, it
is becoming more evident with every passing day that the victories we achieve
will only come at the cost of destruction for the nation we once hoped to help.
. . .
An
American commander said of the town of Ben Tre, "it became necessary to destroy
the town in order to save it." It is difficult to quarrel with the decision of
American commanders to use air power and artillery to save the lives of their
men; if American troops are to fight for Vietnamese cities, they deserve
protection. What I cannot understand is why the responsibility for the recapture
and attendant destruction of Hue, and Ben Tre and the others, should fall to
American troops in the first place.
If
Communist insurgents or invaders held New York or Washington or San Francisco,
we would not leave it to foreigners to take them back, and destroy them and
their people in the process....
If the
government's troops will not or cannot carry the fight for their cities, we
cannot our-selves destroy them. That kind of salvation is not an act we can
presume to perform for them. For we must ask our government－we
must ask our-selves: where does such logic end? If it becomes "necessary" to
destroy all of South Vietnam in order to "save" it, will we do that too? And if
we care so little about South Vietnam that we are willing to see the land
destroyed and its people dead, then why are we there in the first place?
Can we
ordain to ourselves the awful majesty of God－to
decide what cities and villages are to be destroyed, who will live and who will
die, and who will join the refugees wandering in a desert of our own creation? .
. .
Let us
have no misunderstanding. The Viet Cong are a brutal enemy indeed. Time and time
again, they have shown their willingness to sacrifice innocent civilians, to
engage in torture and murder and despicable terror to achieve their ends. This
is a war almost without rules or quarter. There can be no easy moral answer to
this war, no one-sided condemnation of American actions. What we must ask
ourselves is whether we have a right to bring so much destruction to another
land, without clear and convincing evidence that this is what its people want.
But that is precisely the evidence we do not have. What they want is peace, not
dominated by any out-side forces. And that is what we are really committed to
help bring them, not in some indefinite future, but while some scraps of life
remain still to be saved from the holocaust.
The
fourth fact that is now more clear than ever is that the war in Vietnam, far
from being the last critical test for the United States is in fact weakening our
position in Asia and around the world, and eroding the structure of
international cooperation which has directly supported our security for the past
three decades. . . . We set out to prove our willingness to keep our commitments
everywhere in the world. What we are ensuring instead is that it is most
unlikely that the American people would ever again be willing to . . . engage in
this kind of struggle. Meanwhile our oldest and strongest allies pullback to
their own shores, leaving us alone to police all of Asia. . . .
We are
entitled to ask－we
are required to ask－how
many more men, how many more lives, how much more destruction will be asked, to
provide the military victory that is always just around the corner, to pour into
this bottomless pit of our dreams? But this question the Administration does
not and cannot answer. It has no answer－none
but the ever-expanding use of military force and the lives of our brave
soldiers, in a conflict where military force has failed to solve anything in the
past. . . .
It is
long past time to ask: what is this war doing to us? Of course it is costing us
money－fully
one-fourth of our federal budget－but
that is the smallest price we pay. The cost is in our young men, the tens of
thousands of their lives cut off forever. The cost is in our world position－in
neutrals and allies alike, every day more baffled by and estranged from a policy
they can-not understand.
Higher
yet is the price we pay in our inner-most lives, and in the spirit of our
country. For the first time in a century, we have open resistance to service in
the cause of the nation. For the first time perhaps in our history, we have
desertions from our army on political and moral grounds. The front pages of our
newspapers show photographs of American soldiers torturing prisoners. Every
night we watch horror on the evening news. Violence spreads inexorably across
the nation, filling our streets and crippling our lives. And whatever the costs
to us, let us think of the young men we have sent there: not just the killed,
but those who have to kill; not just the maimed, but also those who must look
upon the results of what they do. . . .
The costs
of the wear's present course far out-weigh anything we can reasonably hope to
gain by it, for ourselves or for the people of Vietnam. It must be ended, and it
can be ended, in a peace of brave men who have fought each other with a terrible
fury, each believing that he alone was in the right. We have prayed to different
gods, and the prayers of neither have been answered fully. Now, while there is
still time for some of them to be partly answered, now is the time to stop.
And the
fact is that much can be done. We can－as
I have urged for two years, but as we have never done－negotiate
with the National Liberation Front. We can－as
we have never done－assure
the Front a genuine place in the political life of South Vietnam. We can－as
we are refusing to do today－begin
to deescalate the war, concentrate on protecting populated areas, and thus save
American lives and slowdown the destruction of the countryside. We can－as
we have never done－insist
that the Government of South Vietnam broaden its base, institute real reforms,
and seek an honorable settlement with their fellow countrymen. . . .
Even this
modest and reasonable program is impossible while our present leadership, under
the illusion that military victory is just ahead, plunges deeper into the swamp
that is our present course....
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