亞伯拉罕‧林肯
(ABRAHAM LINCOLN)

在庫珀學會的演說
The Cooper Union Speech

我們要堅信正義即力量，並且在這個信念指引下，敢於照我們所理解的那樣，把我們的責任履行到底。

在1860年爭奪共和黨總統候選人的提名中，林肯只是個不知名的競爭者。在伊利諾伊州之外，幾乎沒人知道他這個人。他同道格拉斯的辯論引起人們對他的注意，然後在1859年，他在中西部幾個州發表演說，1860年2月27日在紐約市的庫珀學會，他對一大群聽眾發表演說。這次演說使他打進了前紐約州長、共和黨總統候選人提名的主要競爭者威廉．H．蘇厄德家鄉。緊接著在紐約的勝利之後，林肯又去新英格蘭演說，這又使他引起美國東北部那些關鍵代表的注意。1860年5月在芝加哥舉行的共和黨全國代表大會上，林肯在第三次投票中獲得提名。

六十年後，H‧L‧門肯還認為那次在庫珀學會的演說使林肯「得到了總統職位」。參議員斯蒂芬‧A‧道格拉斯(此人不久就成為民主黨提名的總統候選人，在總統大選中是林肯的對手)曾斷言創建這個國家的先輩們是故意要保留奴隸制的。林肯在庫珀學會的演說中則對他這種說法表示懷疑。在這篇受到廣泛注意的演說中就奴隸制這個問題，林肯仔細分析了那些制定憲法的人的意圖。其意義超過了對前人意圖的研究；一百多年後，法律學者還繼續辯論究意那些憲法制定者們是否想結束奴隸制。

……據《紐約時報》報導，去年秋天，參議員道格拉斯先生在俄亥俄州哥倫布所作的一篇演講中曾說：

「當我們的先輩組建管轄我們的這個政府時，他們跟我們一樣理解這個問題，甚至比我們現在理解得更好。」

我完全贊同這種說法，並以此作為我這篇演講的一個主題。我之所以這樣做是因為它為共和黨人和民主黨中以參議員道格拉斯先生為首的那一翼之間的討論提供了一個準確一致的出發點……

誰是我們制定憲法的先輩們呢?我以為在原始文件上簽名的那「三十九」位可以明確地稱為我們組建了現政府的那個部分的先輩……

根據引文說那些先輩們跟我們一樣理解這個問題，甚至比我們現在理解得更好。那麼這個問題是什麼呢?

這個問題是這樣的：地方權威和聯邦權威的適當分開或者憲法中有什麼條文是否能禁止聯邦政府在聯邦土地上控制奴隸制?

對於這個問題，道格拉斯認為答案是肯定的，而共和黨人認為是否定的。這種肯定與否定的對立就構成一個問題，這個問題正是那段引文所宣稱的我們的先輩比我們更理解的問題。

現在我們不妨問這樣一個問題：到底那「三十九」位或他們之中任何一位曾遵照這個問題行事，如果他們真這麼做了，那他們是怎麼做的──他們是怎麼表達出那種更好的理解的。

在1874年，即憲法產生前三年，當時美國只佔有西北地區的土地，沒有其他的領土，那時美國十三州邦聯議會就已經遇到了在那片土地上禁止奴隸制的問題；後來參加制定憲法的那「三十九」位簽名人中的四人就是那個議會的成員，並參加了對禁奴問題的投票表決。這四個人中，羅傑‧沙曼(Roger Sherman)、托馬斯‧米夫林 (Thomas Mifflin)、休‧威廉森 (Hugh Williamson) 都投票贊成禁止奴隸制，這就表明根據他們的理解，地方權威和聯邦權威的分離或任何別的什麼都沒有理由禁止聯邦政府在聯邦領土內控制奴隸制。這四個人中的另一個人詹姆斯‧麥克亨利 (James McHenry) 投票反對禁止奴隸制，這表明，由於某種原因，他認為投票贊成禁止奴隸制是不適當的。

在1787年，仍然是在憲法產生之前，但這時制憲會議正在開會制定憲法，而且這時西北地區的領土仍然是美國佔有的唯一領土，就在這個時候，禁止奴隸制的問題又一次提到十三州邦聯議會上，後來在憲法上簽名的那「三十九」人中又有兩人參加了那次邦聯議會，而且參加了禁奴問題的投票表決。他們是威廉‧布朗特 (William Blount)和威廉‧菲尤 (William Few)，兩人都投票贊成禁止奴隸制……

在1789年，根據憲法召開的第一次邦聯議會通過一個法案實施1787年的法令，其中包括在西北領土上禁止奴隸制，這個法案的議案是由那「三十九」位簽名人之一，托馬斯‧菲茨西蒙斯 (Thomas Fitzsimmons) 向議會報告的，他當時是由賓夕法尼亞來的眾議院議員。議案通過各個階段沒有人說一句反對的話，最後沒有投贊成票和反對票就在兩院通過，這就等於是全體一致通過。在這次議會中，制定原始憲法的「三十九」位先輩中有十六位參加。他們是：約翰‧蘭登 (John Langdon)，尼古拉斯‧吉爾曼(Nicholas Gilman)，威廉‧S‧約翰森 (Wm. S. Johnson)，羅傑，捨曼 (Roger Sherman)，羅伯特‧莫裏斯 (Robert Morris)，托馬斯‧菲茨西蒙斯 (Thos. Fitzsimmons)，威廉‧菲尤 (William Few)，亞伯拉罕‧鮑德溫 (Abraham Baldwin)，魯弗斯‧金 (Rufus King)，威廉‧帕滕森 (William Patterson)，喬治‧克萊默 (George Clymer)，理查德‧巴西特 (Richard Bassett)，喬治‧裏德 (George Read)，皮爾斯‧巴特勒 (Pierce Butler)，丹厄爾‧卡羅爾 (Daniel Carrol)，詹姆斯‧麥迪遜 (James Madison) ……

還有當時的美國總統喬治‧華盛頓也是那「三十九」位簽名人之一，他以總統的名義批准了提案並在上面簽字，這樣就完成了使之作為法律而生效的程序，而且也表明，根據華盛頓的理解，聯邦權威與地方權威的分離或者憲法中的任何規定都無法禁止聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制。

原來的憲法通過後不久，北卡羅來納州就把現在是因納西州的那塊地方割給聯邦政府，幾年後，喬治亞州也把現在是密西西比州和亞拉巴馬州的那片土地割給聯邦政府。在這兩個割地契約上，割地的州都規定了一個條件，即聯邦政府不能在被割的土地上禁止奴隸制。除此之外，當時在被割的土地上實際已存在奴隸制。在這些情況下，國會為了管理這些地方，並沒在這些地方內絕對禁止奴隸制。但是國會實際上是干預了──對奴隸制進行控制──即使在那些地方，也控制到一定程度。1798年，國會組建密西西比 準州。在組織法案中，國會通過罰款和釋放帶進的奴隸來禁止從美國以外的任何地方將奴隸帶進這個準州。這個法案在兩院得到一致通過。制定原來憲法的那「三十九」位簽名人中有三人在那個議會裏。他們是：約翰‧蘭登 (John Langdon)、喬治‧裏德 (George Read) 和亞伯拉罕‧鮑德溫 (Abraham Baldwin)……

在1803年，聯邦政府買下了路易斯安那那片土地。以前我們是從自己的某些州中獲取土地的；但這塊路易斯安那是向外國買來的。1804年，國會將現在是路易斯安那州的那部分地方進行領土組織。位於那塊土地之中的新奧爾良是一個相當大的舊城市，還有其他相當多的城鎮與居住地，在這些地方，奴隸制已廣泛徹底地與人民混合在一起。國會並沒有在領土法案中禁止奴隸制，但國會實際上是干預了──控制了奴隸制──而且比在密西西比做得更明顯、更廣泛。針對奴隸問題所制定的條款是：

(1)不能從外國進口奴隸到那地方。
(2)不能將1798年5月1日以來進口到美國的奴隸帶進那個地方。
(3)除非奴隸主將奴隸帶進來並供他自己作為居留者使用，任何奴隸都不準被帶進來。所有違反法律的情況，都將受到罰款處罰，並將奴隸釋放。

這個法案也得到一致通過，在通過這個法案的那次議會裏有兩人在「三十九」位簽名人之中。他們是：亞伯拉罕‧鮑德溫 (Abraham Baldwin)和喬納森‧戴頓 (Jonathan Dayton)……

在18l9年至1820年之間提出了密蘇裏問題並得到通過。就這個總的問題的各個方面，國會兩院通過投贊成票和反對票進行了多次表決。「三十九」位簽名人中有兩人──魯弗斯‧金 (Rufus King) 和查理斯‧平克尼 (Charles Pinckney) ──是那次議會的成員。金先生堅定地投票贊成廢除奴隸制並反對任何妥協，而平克尼先生則投票反對禁止奴隸制而且也反對任何妥協……

我所提到的這些情況僅僅是這「三十九」人或者他們中的任何一個人就這個直接的問題所採取的行動，這就是我所能發現的……

那麼，在此，我們那「三十九」位組建了管轄我們的政府的先輩之中有二十三位，根據他們的公務職責和手按《聖經》所發的誓，就那個問題採取了行動，這個問題正是前面引文所肯定的「他們跟我們一樣理解，而且甚至比我們現在理解得更好」的問題。他們當中的二十三人──這顯然是「三十九」人中的多數──對這個問題採取了這樣的行動，如果根據他們的理解，地方權威與聯邦權威的任何適當分離，或者他們親自製定並發誓支援的憲法中的任何規定，會禁止聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制，那他們就犯有粗鄙的政治錯誤和故意偽証罪。因此這二十三人採取了行動，行動勝於空談，而根據這種責任所採取的行動就更勝於空談了……

那「三十九」位簽名人中剩下的十六人，就我所瞭解的，沒有留下任何記錄表明他們對聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制這個直接問題的理解。但是有理由相信，如果他們的理解曾得到表明，那麼他們對這個問題的理解也不會表現出與他們那二十三個同伴有什麼不同。

為了嚴格信守引文，除了制定原來憲法的那「三十九」先輩之外，我有意略去了任何其他人所表示的理解，不管他們有多麼顯赫，而且為了同樣理由，我也略去了這「三十九」人中的任何一位就奴隸制這個總的問題的其他方面所表示的理解。如果我們真的審查一下他就諸如對外奴隸買賣。以及奴隸制的道德和政策等其他方面的問題所採取的行動和發表的聲明，那麼在我們看來，就聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制這個直接問題，如果那十六人曾經採取行動的話，他們也許會和那二十三人採取同樣的行動。在那十六人有幾個人名列當時最著名的反奴隸制人士之中，──如佛蘭克林博士 (Dr. Franklin)、亞歷山大‧漢密爾頓 (Alexander Hamilton) 和古維諾爾‧莫裏斯 (Gouverneur Morris) ──據現在所知其中沒有一個人的態度是與此相反的，若有可能，除非是南卡羅來納的約翰‧拉特利奇 (John Rutledge)。

我們那「三十九」位制定了原來憲法的先輩中總共有二十三人──這是明顯的多數──肯定認為聯邦權威與地方權威的適當分離，或憲法中的任何條款都不能禁止聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制，而所有其餘的人也許是有同樣的理解。毫無疑問這就是我們那些制定了原來憲法的先輩們的理解，而且引文也肯定認為他們對這個問題的理解「比我們更好」。

我們完全可以假定那「三十九」位制定了原來憲法的先輩再加上七十六位制定了修正案的議員，加在一起，肯定包括了那些可以被恰當地稱為「組建了管轄我們的政府的先輩」。基於這種假定，我反對任何人表示他們其中任何一個人，在他的一生中曾宣佈根據他的理解，聯邦權威與地方權威的適當分離，或者憲法中的任何條款，可禁止聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制。我還要進一步反對任何人表示在整個世界任何一個活著的人曾在本世紀初之前(我幾乎要說是在本世紀後半葉之前)曾宣佈過，根據他的理解，地方權威與聯邦權威的適當分離，或者憲法中的任何條款會禁止聯邦政府在聯邦領土上控制奴隸制。對於那些宣稱會禁止的人，我不僅可以拿出「我們那些組建了管轄我們的政府的先輩們」，而且在政府組建的那個世紀內所有其他活著的人也可拿出來與先輩們放在一起讓他們去尋找，他們將無法找出任何一個人同意他們看法的證據。

現在，在此，我得略為防備，以免誤解。我不是說我們一定要盲目照搬我們的先輩所做的任何事情，這樣做就要摒棄現今經驗中所有能幫助我們理解的事實，排斥一切進步和提高。我所真正要說的是，如果我們要在任何情況下取代我們先輩的意見和政策，我們就應當依據確鑿的證據、明確的論點，使其權威在經過相當的考慮和掂量之後還能站得住腳，而且肯定不是我們自己宣佈他們對這個問題的理解比我們更好，……

現在，如果他們願意聽的話──我想他們是不願意聽的──我想對南方人說幾句話。

我要對他們說：你們認為自己是通情達理和公正的人，而我認為在講道理和公正這些普通品質上，你們不比其他任何人差。可是，當你們說起我們共和黨人時，你們只會罵我們卑鄙，或者說最好也不比亡命之徒強……

你們說我們是地方主義的。我們否認。這就造成爭執，而你們有責任提出證據來。你們提出你們的證據，那是什麼證據呢?喏，我們黨在你們的地區是不存在的──在你們的地區得不到選票。這完全是事實，但它能說明問題嗎?如果能說明問題的話，那麼，假如我們不改變原則而開始在你們的地區獲得選票，我們就不再是地方主義了。這個結論你們不會看不到。可是，你們願意遵守這個結論嗎?如果願意，也許你們很快就會發現我們不再是地方主義的了，因為我們今年將在你們的地區獲得選票。那時你們就會發現，事實明擺著，你們的證據沒有觸及問題……

你們有些人喜歡當著我們的面賣弄華盛頓在他的告別演說中提出的對地方主義的警告。在華盛頓提出那個警告不到八年前，他作為合眾國總統，曾經贊同並簽署了一項國會法案，在西北 準州禁止奴隸制，這項法案體現了直到他提出那個警告時和提出警告的那個時刻，政府對這個問題的政策；而在他提出警告大約一年之後，他寫信給拉斐葉特，說他認為在西北 準州禁止奴隸制是個明智的措施，並且表示希望將來能由各自由州組成邦聯。

記住這一點，再來看一看自從那時以後在這同一問題上已經出現的地方主義，那麼，華盛頓的警告到底是你們手裏反對我們的武器呢，還是我們手裏反對你們的武器?要是華盛頓本人還能說話，他究竟會指責我們這些支援他政策的人犯有地方主義呢，還是指責你們這些反對他的政策的人犯有地方主義？……

就算你們能夠……破壞共和黨的組織，這對你們又有多大益處呢?人的行為可以在某種程度上改變，可是人的天性卻是改變不了的。在這個國家有一種反對奴隸制的意見和感情，至少可以投一百五十萬張票。我們的政治組織就是靠這種意見和感情──這種情感而聚集起來的，你們即使把這個組織破壞掉，也摧毀不了這種情感。一支在你們猛烈炮火下建立起來的紀律嚴明的軍隊，你們是很難打垮的。但是，即便你們能打垮它，用武力使造就那支軍隊的情感越出投票箱的和平軌道而進入其他軌道，這對你們又有什麼好處呢?那另一種軌道大概會是什麼呢?像約翰‧布朗 (John Browns) 那樣的人會因為這個行動減少還是增加呢?

然而，你們寧可使聯邦分裂也不甘心讓人剝奪憲法賦予你們的權利。

這聽起來有點草率，但是，如果我們提議僅靠人數多的力量來剝奪憲法明文規定給你們的權利，情況就會緩和，即使這種做法不完全正當。但我們不會提出這種建議。

當你們作這些聲明時，你們明明是暗示憲法給你們權利把奴隸帶進聯邦各準州，並把他們留在那裏作為你們的財產。可是憲法裏並沒有專門規定這種權利。在那個文件裏，根本沒有提到這種權利。相反地，我們就不認為憲法裏規定了這樣一種權利，甚至連言外之意都沒有。

那麼，你們的目的，說穿了就是要搞垮政府，除非允許你們在你們和我們之間有爭議的各點上隨心所欲地解釋和強制實施憲法。不管怎樣，你們要麼掌權，要麼覆滅。

這說穿了就是你們要對我們說的話。也許你們會說，對於這個有爭議的憲法問題，最高法院正作出對你們有利的判決。不見得吧。但是，撇開法學家關於「法官的意見」和「判決」兩者之間的區別不談，最高法院已經多少對這個問題給你們作出了決定。法院實質上是說你們享有憲法規定的權利，把奴隸帶進聯邦各 準州，並且把他們留在那裏作為你們的財產。

我說多少作出了決定，意思是說決定是在一個分裂為兩派的法院，由法官的微弱多數作出的。他們對於作出決定的理由，看法各不相同。由於這個判決是這樣作出的，致使那些自認是這個判決的支持者們對其意義也有不同的看法。而且它主要是依據一個不實之詞，即那個意見中所說的：「對奴隸的財產權是憲法專門地和明確地規定的。」

把憲法仔細研究一下，就可以看到它裏面對奴隸的財產權並沒有作專門的和明確的規定……

如果他們只是用法官的見解說這種權利在文件裏是含蓄地獲得肯定的，這樣別人就會說憲法裏既找不到「奴隸」，也找，不到「奴隸制」這個詞，甚至與暗指奴隸或奴隸制這類東西有關的「財產」這個詞也沒有；文件中凡暗指奴隸的地方，都稱他為「人」；凡是指奴隸主對他的合法權利的地方，都稱為「應得的勞役或勞力」──稱為可用勞役或勞力償付的「債務」。同樣也可以用當時的歷史來證明，用這種暗指奴隸和奴隸制的方法，而不是明說出來，是有目的的，就是不讓憲法裏有一種可以把人當財產的想法……

在所有這些情況下，你是不是真以為自己有理由搞垮這個政府，除非大家馬上服從像你們那樣的法院判決，把它作為政治行動的結論性的和最後的準則?但是，你們不能容忍一個共和黨入當選為總統!你們說，如果發生那種情況，你們就要搞垮聯邦；你們說，那時，搞垮聯邦的嚴重罪名就會落在我們頭上!妙極了。一個攔路強盜用手槍指住我的腦袋，咬牙切齒地說，「留下買路錢，不然我就打死你，那時你將是一個殺人犯！」……

現在再來向共和黨人說幾句話。讓這個偉大聯邦所有各部分都太太平平，彼此和睦相處，這是最合乎理想的。我們共和黨人應該盡力做到這一點。儘管我們受到很大挑釁，也不要意氣用事。即使南方人不願意聽我們的話，我們還是要冷靜地考慮他們的要求，如果審慎地考慮到我們的職責，可能的話應當接受他們的要求。我們要根據他們所說和所做的一切，以及他們和我們爭端的原因和性質，盡可能決定哪些事情可以使他們滿意。

如果使各準州無條件服從他們，他們會滿意嗎?我們知道他們是不會滿意的。在他們目前對我們的一切責難中，幾乎沒有提到 準州。目前叫得最起勁的是入侵和造反。如果今後證明我們同入侵和造反毫無牽連，他們會滿意嗎?我們知道他們是不會滿意的。我們之所以知道是因為我們從來沒有同入侵和造反有過牽連。可是儘管我們毫無牽連，還是免不了受到攻擊和責難。

問題又來了：究竟什麼才能使他們滿意呢?……這個，只有這個：不再說奴隸制是錯誤的。要和他們一起說奴隸制是正確的。而且這必須做得徹底──不但在口頭而且在行動上都要做到。他們是不會容忍我們沈默的──我們必須公開宣佈和他們站在一起。道格拉斯參議員的新煽動叛亂法必須得到通過和實施，一切有關奴隸制是錯誤的言論，無論是在政綱裏、在報刊上、在講壇上，或是在私下發表的，都必須禁止。我們必須歡歡喜喜地把他們逃亡的奴隸抓住，送回原主。我們必須取消各自由州的憲法。整個氣氛必須肅清一切反對奴隸制的影響，只有這樣做以後，他們才不再認為他們的一切麻煩都是從我們這裏來的……

他們既然認為奴隸制在道德上是正確的，而且在社會上是高尚的，他們就不會停止要求全國把奴隸制當作一種合法權利和社會幸福加以承認。

我們也只有堅信奴隸制是錯誤的這個立場才能正當地制止這種情況。如果奴隸制是正確的，一切反對奴隸制的言語、行為、法律和憲法本身就是錯誤的，必須加以制止和肅清。如果奴隸制是正確的，我們反對它推行到全國推行到全世界，就不合理；如果奴隸制是錯誤的，他們硬要將之推廣──擴大，那就不合理。如果我們認為奴隸制是正確的，他們的一切要求我們都願意答應；如果他們認為奴隸制是錯誤的，我們的一切要求他們也都願意答應。他們認為奴隸制是正確的，我們認為奴隸制是錯誤的，這就是整個爭端的癥結。他們認為奴隸制是正確的，這就難怪他們希望把奴隸制當作正確的東西予以充分肯定。但是，我們認為奴隸制是錯誤的，我們能向他們屈服嗎?我們能根據他們的觀點來投票反對我們自己的觀點嗎?鑒 於我們在道德上、社會上和政治上的責任，我們能這樣做嗎?

雖然我們認為奴隸制是錯誤的，但是在實行奴隸制的地方，我們還是可以隨它去，因為那是出於它在國內實際存在的需要。可是，投票可以制止奴隸制時，難道我們能容許它擴展到各 準州，並且到這些自由州來侵擾我們嗎?

如果我們的責任感不允許這樣，那麼就讓我們無畏地和有效地堅持我們的責任吧。決不要被那些一直困擾著我們的精心策劃的詭計轉移我們的方向，這些詭計多得很，例如在是和非之間找一個中間立場，這就像找一個既不是死人也不是活人的人一樣枉費心機；就好像對一個所有正直的人都要關心的問題採取「不在乎」的政策；就像是以聯邦的名義呼籲真正擁護聯邦的人服從分裂主義者，把神聖的原則顛倒過來，不是叫有罪的人悔改，反而叫正直的人悔改；就像是要召請華盛頓的亡靈，懇求人們收回他所說的話，取消他所做的事。

同樣不要讓不實的指責使我們偏離我們的責任，也不要被搞垮政府或把我們送入地牢的威脅嚇得不敢履行我們的責任。我們要堅信正義即力量，並且在這個信念指引下，敢於像我們所理解的那樣，把我們的責任履行到底。

The Cooper Union Speech

In his speech last autumn at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New York Times, Senator Douglas said:

    "Our fathers, when they framed the Government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now."

    I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I so adopt it because it furnishes a precise and an agreed starting point for the discussion between Republicans and that wing of the Democracy headed by Senator Douglas. ...

    Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the "thirty-nine" who signed the original instrument may be fairly called our fathers who framed that part of the present Government. ...

    What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers understood just as well, and even better, than we do now?

    It is this: Does the proper division of local from federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbid our Federal Government control as to slavery in our Federal Territories?

    Upon this, Douglas holds the affirmative, and Republicans the negative. This affirmative and denial form an issue; and this issue--this question--is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood better than we.

    Let us now inquire whether the "thirty-nine," or any of them, ever acted upon this question; and if they did, how they acted upon it--how they expressed that better understanding.

    In 1784, three years before the Constitution, the United States then owning the Northwestern Territory, and no other, the Congress of the Confederation had before them the question of prohibiting slavery in that Territory; and four of the "thirty-nine" who afterward framed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on that question. Of these, Roger Sherman, Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh Williamson voted for the prohibition, thus showing that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbade the Federal Government control as to Slavery in federal territory. The other of the four, James McHenry, voted against the prohibition, showing that for some cause he thought it improper to vote for it.

    In 1787, still before the Constitution, but while the Convention was in session framing it, and while the Northwestern Territory still was the only territory owned by the United States, the same question of prohibiting slavery in the territory again came before the Congress of the Confederation; and two more of the "thirty-nine," who afterward signed the Constitution, were in that Congress, and voted on the question. They were William Blount and William Few; and they both voted for the prohibition . . .

    In 1789, by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution, an act was passed to enforce the Ordinance of '87, including the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory. The bill for this act was reported by one of the "thirty-nine"--Thomas Fitzsimmons, then a member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania. It went through all its stages without a word of opposition, and finally passed both branches without yeas and nays, which is equivalent to a unanimous passage. In this Congress there were sixteen of the "thirty-nine" fathers who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, Nicholas Oilman, Wm. S. Johnson, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, Thos. Fitzsimmons, William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Ruflis King, William Patterson, George Clymer, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler, Daniel Carrol, James Madison. . . .

    Again, George Washington, another of the "thirty-nine," was then President of the United States, and as such approved and signed the bill, thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in his understanding, no line dividing local from federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government control as to slavery in federal territory.

    No great while after the adoption of the original Constitution, North Carolina ceded to the Federal Government the country now constituting the State of Tennessee; and a few years later Georgia ceded that which now constitutes the States of Mississippi and Alabama. In both deeds of cession it was made a condition by the ceding States that the Federal Government should not prohibit slavery in the ceded country. Besides this, slavery was then actually in the ceded country. Under these circumstances. Congress, on taking charge of these countries, did not absolutely prohibit slavery within them. But they did interfere with it--take control of it--even there, to a certain extent. In 1798 Congress organized the Territory of Mississippi. In the act of organization they prohibited the bringing of slaves into the Territory from any place without the United States by fine and giving freedom to slaves so brought. This act passed both branches of Congress without yeas and nays. In that Congress were three of the "thirty-nine" who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, George Read, and Abraham Baldwin. ...

    In 1803 the Federal Government purchased the Louisiana country. Our former territorial acquisitions came from certain of our own States; but this Louisiana country was acquired from a foreign nation. In 1804 Congress gave a territorial organization to that part of it which now constitutes the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, lying within that part, was an old and comparatively large city. There were other considerable towns and settlements, and slavery was extensively and thoroughly intermingled with the people. Congress did not, in the Territorial Act, prohibit slavery; but they did interfere with it--take control of it--in a more marked and extensive way than they did in the case of Mississippi. The substance of the provision therein made in relation to slaves was:

    (1) That no slave should be imported into the territory from foreign parts.

    (2) That no slave should be carried into it who had been imported into the United States since the first day of May, 1798.

    (3) That no slave should be carried into it, except by the owner, and for his own use as a settler; the penalty in all the cases being a fine upon the violator of the law, and freedom to the slave.

    This act also was passed without yeas and nays. In the Congress which passed it there were two of the "thirty-nine." They were Abraham Baldwin and Jonathan Dayton. . . .

    In 1819-20 came and passed the Missouri question. Many votes were taken, by yeas and nays, in both branches of Congress, upon the various phases of the general question. Two of the "thirty-nine"--Rufus King and Charles Pinckney--were members of that Congress. Mr. King steadily voted for slavery prohibition and against all compromises, while Mr. Pinckney as steadily voted against slavery prohibition and against all compromises. . . .

    The cases I have mentioned are the only acts of the "thirty-nine," or of any of them, upon the direct issue, which I have been able to discover. ...

    Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our "thirty-nine" fathers who framed the Government under which we live, who have, upon their official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very question which the text affirms they "understood just as well, and even better, than we do now"; and twenty-one of them--a clear majority of the whole "thirty-nine"--so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross political impropriety and willful perjury if, in their understanding, any proper division between local and federal authority, or anything in the Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the Federal Government control as to slavery in the federal territories. Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak louder than words, so actions under such responsibility speak still louder. . . .

    The remaining sixteen of the "thirty-nine," so far as I have discovered, have left no record of their understanding upon the direct question of federal control of slavery in the Federal Territories. But there is much reason to believe that their understanding upon that question would not have appeared different from that of their twenty-three compeers, had it been manifested at all.

    For the purpose of adhering rigidly to the text, I have purposely omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any person, however distinguished, other than the "thirty-nine" fathers who framed the original Constitution; and, for the same reason, I have also omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any of the "thirty-nine" even on any other phase of the general question of slavery. If we should look into their acts and declarations on those other phases, as the foreign slave-trade, and the morality and policy of slavery generally, it would appear to us that on the direct question of federal control of slavery in Federal Territories, the sixteen, if they had acted at all, would probably have acted just as the twenty-three did. Among that sixteen were several of the most noted anti-slavery men of those times,--as Dr. Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris,--while there was not one now known to have been otherwise, unless it may be John Rutledge, of South Carolina.

    The sum of the whole is, that of our "thirty-nine" fathers who framed the original Constitution, twenty-one--a clear majority of the whole--certainly understood that no proper division of local from federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories; while all the rest probably had the same understanding. Such, unquestionably, was the understanding of our fathers who framed the original Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the question "better than we."...

    It is surely safe to assume that the "thirty-nine" framers of the original Constitution, and the seventy-six members of the Congress which framed the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly include those who may be fairly called "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live." And so assuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them ever, in his whole life, declared that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government control as to slavery in the Federal Terrorities. I go a step further. I defy any one to show that any living man in the whole world ever did, prior to the beginning of the present century (and I might almost say prior to the beginning of the last half of the present century), declare that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government control as to slavery in the Federal Territories. To those who now so declare I give not only "our fathers who framed the Government under which we live," but with them all other living men within the century in which it was framed, among whom to search, and they shall not be able to find the evidence of a single man agreeing with them.

    Now, and here, let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our fathers did. To do so would be to discard all the lights of current experience, to reject all progress, all improvement. What I do say is that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot stand; and most surely not in a case whereof we ourselves declare they understood the question better than we. . . .

    And now, if they would listen,--as I suppose they will not,--I would address a few words to the Southern people.

   I would say to them: You consider yourselves a reasonable and a just people; and I consider that in the general qualities of reason and justice you are not inferior to any other people. Still, when you speak of us Republicans, you do so only to denounce us as reptiles, or, at the best, as no better than outlaws ....

    You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you. You produce your proof; and what is it? Why, that our party has no existence in your section--gets no votes in your section. The fact is substantially true; but does it prove the issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of principle, begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease to be sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet, are you willing to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find that we have ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section this very year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly is, that your proof does not touch the issue. . . .

    Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory, which act embodied the policy of the government upon that subject up to and at the very moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it he wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same connection his hope that we should some time have a confederacy of free States.

    Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon you, who repudiate it? . . .

    And how much would it avail you, if you could. . . break up the Republican organization?  Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. There is a judgment and a feeling against slavery in this nation, which cast at least a million and a half of votes. You cannot destroy that judgment and feeling--that sentiment--by breaking up the political organization which rallies around it. You can scarcely scatter and disperse an army which has been formed into order in the face of your heaviest fire; but if you could, how much would you gain by forcing the sentiment which created it out of the peaceful channel of the ballot box into some other channel? What would that other channel probably be? Would the number of John Browns be lessened or enlarged by the operation?

    But you will break up the Union rather than submit to a denial of your Constitutional rights. That has a somewhat reckless sound; but it would be palliated, if not fully justified, were we proposing, by the mere force of numbers, to deprive you of some right plainly written down in the Constitution. But we are proposing no such thing.

    When you make these declarations, you have a specific and well-understood allusion to an assumed Constitutional right of yours to take slaves into the Federal Territories and hold them there as property. But no such right is specifically written in the Constitution. That instrument is literally silent about any such right. We, on the contrary, deny that such a right has any existence in the Constitution, even by implication.

    Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is that you will destroy the Government, unless you be allowed to construe and enforce the Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and us. You will rule or ruin in all events.

    This, plainly stated, is your language to us. Perhaps you will say the Supreme Court has decided the disputed Constitutional question in your favor. Not quite so. But waiving the lawyer's distinction between dictum and decision, the Court has decided the question for you in a sort of way. The Court has substantially said, it is your Constitutional right to take slaves into the Federal Territories, and to hold them there as property.

    When I say the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it was made in a divided Court, by a bare majority of the Judges, and they not quite agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that it is so made as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another about its meaning, and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken statement of fact--the statement in the opinion that 「the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.」

    An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in it….

    If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to others to show that neither the word 「slave」 nor 「slavery」 is to be found in the Constitution, nor the word 「property」 even, in any connection with language alluding to the things slave, or slavery; and that wherever in that instrument the slaveis alluded to, he is called a 「person」; and wherever his master』s legal right in relation to him is alluded to, it is spoken of as 「service or labor which may be due, 「as a 「debt」 payable in service or labor. Also it would be open to show, by contemporaneous history, that this mode of alluding to slaves and slavery, instead of speaking of them, was employed on purpose to exclude from the Constitution the idea that there could be property in man….

    Under all these circumstances, do you really feel yourselves justified to break up this Government unless such a court decision as yours is shall be at once submitted to as a conclusive and final rule of political action? But you will not abide the election of a Republican President! In that supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union; and then, you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters through his teeth, 「Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer!」….

    A few words now to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace, and in harmony one with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even though the southern people will not so much as listen to us, let us calmly consider their demands, and yield to them if in our deliberate view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say and do, and by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let us determine, if we can, what will satisfy them.

    Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally surrendered to them? We know they will not. In all their present complaints against us, the Territories are scarcely mentioned. Invasions and insurrections are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if, in the future, we have nothing to do with invasions and insurrections? We know we never had anything to do with invasions and insurrections; and yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the charge and the denunciation.

    The question recurs, what will satisfy them? …This, and this only; Cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it right. And this must be done thoroughly--done in acts as well as in words. Silence will not be tolerated--we must place ourselves avowedly with them. Senator Douglas』s new sedition law must be enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is wrong, whether made in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private. We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We must pull down our Free-State Constitutions. The whole atmosphere must be disinfected from all taint of opposition to slavery, before they will cease to believe that all their troubles proceed from us…

    Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right and socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national recognition of it as a legal right and a social blessing.

    Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground save our conviction that slavery is wrong> If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its nationality--its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist upon its extension--its enlargement. All they ask we could readily grant, if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as readily grant if they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and our thinking it wrong is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full recognition as being right; but thinking it wrong, as we do, can we yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view, and against our own? In view of our moral, social, and political responsibilities, can we do this?

    Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it, allow it to spread into the National Territories, and to overrun us here in these Free States?

   If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us stand by our duty fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied and belabored--contrivances such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong; vain as the search for a man who should be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a policy of "don't care" on a question about which all true men do care; such as Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the Divine rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance; such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did.

    Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the Government, nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it.